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Abstract
This paper explores the causal link between associationism and general trust. First we study
the principal components that constitute social capital. Then we contrast a structural model
identifying the relations between the relevant variables in the so-called Olson-Putnam aporia.
The results of the empirical test on the determinants of social capital allow us to conclude
that the extension of horizontal networks maintains a direct relation with this form of capital,
but not those of vertical type.
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1.- Introduction. 
Despite lacking a solid definition, the emergent notion of social capital is a 
central element in the debate on development. In fact, the basis of this concept is 
strikingly ambiguous. For instance, it can be the generalization of moral norms and at 
the same time, the extension of associative networks and it has even been identified 
tautologically with trust (Paldam, 2000, Sobel, 2002).  
Different research on the topic has an important point in common: the idea that 
trust and internalization of norms of cooperative and prosocial behaviours become 
essential pillars of the economy and society. The role played by trust on economic 
development is not under debate (Zack and Knack, 2001). It is evident that in an 
integrated community, transaction costs (costs of information, monitoring contracts, 
conflicts…) are considerably reduced due to the extension of trust networks, intra and 
extra-firm.  Those societies that display high levels of trust will be able to overcome 
agency problems more easily. In particular, as North writes: "the incapacity of societies 
to develop an effective reinforcement of contracts is the most important source of 
stagnation and underdevelopment of the Third World" (North, 1990: p.54) 
However, the role played by social networks on the generation of trust is not 
evident.  In spite of the apparent identity that most studies on social capital adopt as a 
departure point, the role played by the associative activity is as ambiguous as the social 
capital definition because associationism can create or destroy trust.  
Considering the existing theoretical positions, we can propose two possible 
interpretations. On the one hand, Putnam (1993) attributes the greatest success of 
regions and countries in terms of economic growth to the existence of a strong 
associative frame. These networks develop habits of cooperation, solidarity and interest 
in res-publica, basic attitudes for the resolution of collective and agency problems. This 
author identifies social capital with trust, norms and networks (Putnam, 2001), without 
putting to the test the internal causality of these links (Bjornskov, 2006). On the other 
hand, Olson (1965, 1982) provides an apparently opposite interpretation and argues that 
the social organizations, acting as specialized groups of interest (lobbies), can limit the 
growth possibilities. If the interests of some of these organized groups come into 
conflict with those of disorganized social groups in general, the joint effect on trust and 
consequently on economic activity, would be negative. In that situation, the economy 
and society in general could be captured by the conflicts between organized groups.  
In this paper we have dealt with the relation between associationism and social 
trust, testing the hypothesis that maintains the existence of a direct link between the 
extension of sympathy networks, associationism and social trust1. In this respect we 
have tried to find a way out of what can be called the Olson-Putnam “aporia”. Secondly, 
we have developed an empirical model in order to identify the main determinants of 
social capital testing our hypothesis. Finally, some concluding remarks have been 
summarized. 
 
                                                          
1
 Unlike the studies raised at communitarian level (Alesina and Laferrara, 2000; Glaeser et al. 1999), this 
present work adopts a macrosocial and transcultural point of view. This approach implies a loss of detail 
in the analysis but it allows a more general vision on the causality. 
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2.-Social Capital and its aporias 
Although preoccupation for this concrete subject goes back to the nineteen 
twenties, it is not until R. Putnam’s studies on the Italian regions in the eighties and 
nineties when it is considered an essential aspect of economic and social development. 
The results of his investigation showed that the cause of the sensitive growth differential 
between the south and the north of Italy stemmed from what Maquiavelo denominated 
"virtu civile " (civil virtue) (Putnam, 2000, p. 19). This can be translated as a tendency 
to generate horizontal associations, which constituted a base for economic and social 
development. As Putnam expressed "the good government in Italy is a by-product of the 
choral societies and the soccer clubs" (Putnam, 1993) and civil virtue expresses and 
constructs relations of cooperation and trust among the citizenship. From this 
perspective, associations create a sense of shared responsibility and develop habits of 
cooperation and solidarity, fostering economic growth (1993, 89-90). 
In short, the existence of strong social networks can improve social and 
economic functioning in comparison with non structured societies or groups with no 
unifying link. Nevertheless, the way in which social networks affect economic activity 
is not evident.  
On the contrary, Olson (1968) remarked that the conflicts between groups of 
interest (lobbies) can limit the growth possibilities because these groups that lobby for 
preferential policies can impose disproportionate costs on the rest of society. Taking 
into account the problems of collective action, organizations representing the interests 
of smaller groups will often succeed in its rent seeking activities while organizations 
representing interests of large groups will not emerge. These “distributional coalitions” 
will accumulate over time with adverse consequences on economic performance. The 
especial interest laws and regulations derived from their behavior reduce and distort the 
allocation of investment, labor and other resources and slow down rates of innovation, 
in short, limiting growth (Keefer and Knack, 1997; Knack, 2003)  
However, this resume of Putnam’s and Olson’s social analysis is overly 
simplified. Both perspectives on the same social fact can be compatible, if we 
distinguish sets of groups on the basis of their functioning and objectives. In this 
respect, Putnam also admitted (2000) correcting naïve readers of his work that some 
social networks facilitating cooperation among their members can have detrimental 
effects on the wider community. Then, as he acknowledges in his latter work (2001), 
social capital is not guaranteed to produce positive externalities on society. This has led 
some researchers to distinguish between several types regarding this kind of capital; 
particularly, bonding and bridging social capital. The former is associated with closed 
networks (organizations that encompass people with the same background and with a 
particularistic interest), while the latter entails overlapping networks (organizations that 
bring citizens into contact with people from a cross-section of society) (Paxton, 2002). 
At the same time, Olson took into account that ample groups that are sufficiently 
encompassing with society, as bridging social capital, are not expected to lobby. Thus, 
only a special kind of groups, closed and vertical, act as non encompassing rent seekers 
for this author. Both specifications open a choice of integration that should be put to the 
test, clarifying the causality of social capitalization or the generation of social trust. 
In sum, we hypothesize that social capital as social networks has an ambiguous 
relation with trust. Whilst bridging social capital is directly linked with general trust, 
bonding social capital is inversely related. 
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3.- Empirical evidence  
One of the most used proxies of social capital is the variable "general trust" or 
trust in the population as a whole. In order to get a quantitative measure of trust to be 
applied in our empirical test we have used the World Values Survey2 (WVS) as data 
source (Inglehart, 2000); in particular, the percentage of people interviewed who in each 
country adhere to the statement, "most of the population is object of trust ". By adopting 
this definition we study the concept of generalized trust, as opposed to the specific or 
narrow one, linked to repeated interactions or to relations of proximity. 3 Although the 
question is ambiguous, the introduction of the generic concept of "population" explores 
the perception on the level of trust beyond the close family field.  
In terms of the Theory of Games, this variable is twofold: (i) the attitude 
towards cooperation with anonymous subjects in analogous situations to the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, (ii) the existence of a cooperative approach not limited to certain social 
groups. Therefore, this view also expresses the expectation that other individuals do not 
act opportunistically.4 
Our attention focuses on the study of its causality. However, the determinants 
of trust can be very diverse in nature. On the one hand, trust in others can be the result 
of moral and cultural activity. In this case, trust would be seen strongly influenced by 
individual characteristics and by the level and type of education received, religious 
beliefs, etc. Regarding sympathy relations, one can place more trust in those with whom 
he has a similarity in formation or who belongs to a same social or religious group. 
Accordingly, a society characterised by strong diversity in its composition will show 
low levels of trust and will be based fundamentally on the familiar relations. On the 
other hand, a community with consolidated institutions in the pursuit of deviated 
behaviours and, at the same time, a society made up of ample associations that 
encompass general interest will feel more trustworthy because of its protection and its 
channels of involvement. 
In summary, considering this multiplicity of sources, it is necessary to analyze 
the effects derived from associative activity, the inequality of income levels, ethnic 
polarization, formal institutions for the protection of individual rights, the income per 
capita and the educational levels. 
The results of the World Values Survey5 offer abundant evidence on the 
interrelation between social values, structures and social trust. In order to identify the 
determining factors of general trust, after studying the correlation between variables, we 
have used exploratory techniques of data reduction, in particular, the Principal 
                                                          
2
 The WVS constitutes the survey with the most extensive basis on a world-wide scale. It is formulated on 
a set of 61 countries (82500 interviews). 
3
 These answers have been tested with alternative measures of trust and a correlation close to the identity 
was observed. For example, they bear one narrow relation to the percentage of return of lost objects, 
levels of corruption, etc. (see Keefer and Knack, 1997). They also include the evidence expressed in the 
studies of Putnam (1993). 
4
 The world-wide average of the set of answers, 35.8%, covers up the existence of a strong variability that 
goes from 5% in Peru to a 65% in Norway. 
5
 The WVS, constitutes the survey with the most extensive basis on a world-wide scale. It is formulated 
on a set of 61 countries and significant samples in all of them. Globally one is the result of 82500 
interviews in which all types valuable perceptions are questioned mainly, social bonds etc.  
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Components Analysis (the PCA). We also applied a latent root regression analysis to 
the PCA results with the aim of clarifying the causal link between the orthogonal 
components and general trust. Finally a confirmatory factor analysis is developed 
putting the hypothesis to the test. 
 
a.- Results of Principal Components Analysis 
Table 1 reports the correlations of trust levels with expressive variables of 
certain social values, active participation in diverse forms of associationism, 
institutional trust and some socioeconomic characteristics. 
 
Table 1.- Correlations: Social Capital vs social variables 
Family value  -0,247* Political Associationism  -0,057 
Friendship value    0,274* Economic Associationism  -0,101 
Policy value -0,135 Profesional Associationism   0,102 
Religion value     -0,593** Asistencial Associationism   0,006 
Determination value      0,423** Trust in Church      -0,441** 
Concurrence value     -0,317** Trust in the Army   0,091 
Religious faith     -0,449** Trust in legal system       0,306** 
Religious practice   -0,248* Trust in press   -0,259* 
Low rent     -0,333** Trust in unions     0,242* 
Sport Associationism      0,446** Trust in Politics      0,506** 
Religious Associationism -0,175 Trust in government -0,029 
Cultural Associationism       0,286** Trust in enterprises -0,013 
Labour Associationism         0,38**   
*indicates statistically significant at 5% level; ** at 1% 
 
 
At first glance, there is a highly significant correlation between the general 
trust and trust in the open social institutions (legal and political system), but not with 
particular closed institutions (i.e. church and army). Similarly, a direct relation between 
general trust and civic associationism with a horizontal organization (cultural, sports, 
unions, etc.) is verified, but not with the traditional verticalist groups (religious and 
political associations). Moreover, traditional values such as political and religious 
commitment or the importance of the family (bonding social capital) are inversely 
related to general trust, in contrast to values closely bound with the extension of 
sympathy bonds beyond closed circles. In this sense, the most relevant variables are 
related to bridging social capital, confirming Granovetter’s perspective (1973) on the 
importance of weak ties for the formation of communities.  
These results must be completed with the multivariant analysis. The 
application of the exploratory analysis with varimax rotation groups the variables in 
four explanatory components that account for 75% of the total variance. The description 
of the extracted factors is entirely consistent with the logic presented in the most recent 
studies on the constitution and the effects of social capital (Bjornskov, 2006). In 
particular, the component with a larger explanatory power in the total variance has to do 
with associationism or active participation in organizations, diverse in nature (political, 
religious, professional, etc.). This takes up 30% of the variance and gathers all the 
linked variables with positive loads (see tables 2 and 3). 
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Table  2.- Total explained variance by component 
  
Sum of squared saturations of 
extraction  
Sum of squared saturations of 
rotation 
Component Total 
%  of 
variance % cumulated Total 
%  of 
variance % cumulated 
1 5.689 29.942 29.942 4.909 25.839 25.839 
2 4381 23.057 52.998 4.416 23.242 49.08 
3 3.028 15.939 68.937 3.124 16.441 65.521 
4 1.143 6.014 74.951 1.792 9.431 74.951 
Method: Principal Component Analysis 
 
 
 
Table 3: Principal Component Analysis 
 
Components 
  Associationism 
Trust in 
institutions 
Development 
indicators 
 Associations 
and traditional 
values 
Cultural associationism 0.917    
Economic associationism 0.878    
Professional associationism 0.873   0.325 
Religious associationism 0.798   0.343 
Leisure associationism 0.787  0.432  
Unions 0.621    
Trust in parlament  0.896   
Trust in parties  0.879   
Trust in legal system  0.853   
Trust in government  0.826   
Trust in unions  0.767   
Trust in enterprises 0.396 0.633   
Human Development index   0.870  
PIB pc 0.350  0.848  
Trust in political system  0.433 0.781  
Religious practice   -0.645 0.361 
Family values    0.749 
Charitable associationism 0.508   0.584 
Political associationism 0.507   0.561 
 
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: Normalization Varimax with Kaiser. 
Rotation has converged in 5 iterations.  The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy is 0.728, while Barlett’s Test of 
Sphericity is significant at p < 0.0001. 
Loads below a 0.3 have been supressed 
 
The second factor accounts for 25% of the total variance and includes variables 
that reflect the levels of trust in diverse social and political institutions. We will refer to 
this factor as institutional trust. Once again, all the variables load positively on this 
factor. 
The third factor, including the indicators of development and income, accounts 
for 16% of the variance. Two special features related to this factor are worthy of 
mention as they have theoretical support (Putnam, 1993; North, 1990). On the one hand, 
we find political trust, directly tied to the level of economic and human development. 
Logically, economic growth is related to the solidity of the political framework. Along 
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with this, on the other hand, the variable that reflects the presence of religious attitudes 
bears a negative load. This fact seems coherent with the denominated Hypothesis of 
Secularization, which points out the relevance of the religious behaviors would tend to 
decline when the levels of income, education and urbanization rose. 
Finally, a fourth factor accounts for 6% of the variance, and we can 
denominate it as the relevance of traditional values; that is, the importance of the family 
and membership of welfare or charitable institutions.  
 
b.- Results of latent root regression. 
We have run a regression with the principal components (latent root 
regression) in order to verify the existence of a relationship between the principal 
components and general trust mentioned (Table 4).6  
In general, all the explanatory variables are significant, particularly those 
related to socio-economic development. The levels of associationism and institutional 
trust also show a positive influence. In contrast, the presence of traditional values shows 
a negative coefficient. 
 
Table 4: Regression on principal components 
 
Dependent Variable: trust 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1 61 
Included observations: 61 after adjusting endpoints 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
Prob. 
Fac. Asociationism 
 
2.364944 
 
0.0498 
Fac. Trust in institutions 2.394438 0.0471 
Fac. development indicators 7.576554 0.0000 
Fac. traditional values -4.481868 0.0004 
C 26.40796 0.0000 
R-squared 0.532764  
Adjusted R-squared 0.499389  
Durbin-Watson stat 1.832767  
    F-statistic 15.96341  
    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
 
 
These findings suggest that there are positive and significant links between the 
levels of general trust and the existence of a solid and active associative framework, as 
well as with economic and human development. However, there is not a direct relation 
between trust and respect for traditional values and it is not evident that all kind of 
associations are included whithin this causal link. In fact, the importance of the family, 
religious and even some political institutions seems to be associated with a lack of 
general trust because these kinds of institutions can strengthen some expressions of 
amoral familism and bonding social capital at the same time.  
 
c.- Results of models of structural equations. 
                                                          
6
 Of course, given the orthogonal method of rotation, multicolineality problems do not exist. 
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Given the complexity of the variables included in the previous analysis and the 
existence of feed back links, a more detailed study of the causality requires the use of 
the models of structural equations (path analysis). In order to do so, we have 
constructed a structural model and have tested it using the W.V.S. extracted data (see 
scheme 1) 
 
 
Scheme 1: Structural causality model of general trust 
 
 
 
 
F3 
F4 
Professional associationism Cultural and leisure associationism 
Trust in parliament Trust in unions 
Trust in politics 
Religious and charitable assoc. Political associationism 
F1 
F2 Trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This model allows us to improve the theory by eliminating the non significant 
variables. In the results the causal structure is consistent with the observed data, 
confirming our hypothesis (see table 5). The variables that maintain a strong direct 
connection with general trust have to do with the existence of a solid associative 
network, particularly horizontal associations (i.e. cultural and professional). On the 
contrary, the variables reflecting the existence of institutional trust (trust in political 
parties, unions, government, etc.) show a weaker link and can even be excluded without 
losses in the explicability of the model.  
 
Table 5 .-  Standarized coeficients  
Variables Coeficients 
Trust in parliament F2 0,745** 
Trust in unions F2 0,655* 
Trust in politics F3 1,000* 
Chi-squared = 8.514 
Degrees of freedom = 9 
Level of Probability = 0.483 
 8 
Charitable Associationism F4 0,702* 
Political Associationism F4 0,809* 
Trust F2 0.254 
Trust F3 0,436* 
Trust Cultural and Professional Asoc. 0,827* 
Trust F4 -0,883* 
(*) Significativity: 0,1;  (**) Significativity: 0,05  
 
 
In contrast, the traditional religious and political associationism (organizations 
predominantly verticalist and enclosed) maintains an inverse relation with trust levels.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
The ambiguous definition of social capital incorporates three elements (trust, 
norms and networks) that reflect three distinct phenomena whose internal relations 
should be clarified. One of the main points in common among works about the subject 
is the idea that trust and internalization of behavioural norms lead to cooperative and 
prosocial behaviours and this constitutes one of the essential pillars in the working of 
the economy and society in general.  The conclusions of our paper refer to a previous 
stage, analysing the determinants of trust and questioning the notion of social capital, 
since the relationship between that form of capital and the existence of a dense social 
framework is not immediately obvious.  
This paper has investigated the nature of the relationship between 
associationism and general trust. Empirically, the lack of bridging social capital, 
specially related to the display of a structure of overlapping networks, has a 
considerable effect on trust levels. In contrast, we did not find any link with norms and 
social homogeneity, nor with the solidity of the traditional social institutions (i.e. family 
and religion). In addition, bonding social capital (closed networks) can even be counter-
productive, giving rise to what we could denominate amoral familism. Simultaneously, 
the empirical evidence suggests that trust in the institutional frameworks also plays a 
differentiated role.  
The results derived from empirical evidence seem to confirm Putnam’s thesis, 
but does not refute Olson’s thesis on the logic of collective action. In this sense, it is 
necessary to consider that Olson refers to a particular type of vertical associationism 
(unions, political parties etc.). Therefore, it is plausible to argue that the promotion of 
associative networks, by way of its effect on trust, can generate a favourable influence 
on economic activity. Nevertheless, it is not clear that this promotion must be associated 
with public support.  
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